Abstract. In this paper we investigate the security of irregularly decimated stream ciphers. We present an improved correlation analysis of various irregular decimation mechanisms, which allows us to get much larger correlation probabilities than previously known methods. Then new correlation attacks are launched against the shrinking generator with Krawczyk's parameters, LILI-, DECIM v2 and DECIM-128 to access the security margin of these ciphers. We show that the shrinking generator with Krawczyk's parameters is practically insecure; the initial internal state of LILI-can be recovered reliably in 2 72.5 operations, if 2 24.1 -bit keystream and 2
Introduction
Irregular decimation (or irregular clocking) is a well-known strategy in hardwareoriented stream cipher design. It is commonly believed that such a mechanism can strengthen the security of the underlying pseudo-random bit generators with respect to correlation [4, 5, 20, 23, 27] and algebraic attacks [9, 10] .
In this paper we consider four well-known stream ciphers using irregular decimation as the main protective mechanism, namely, the shrinking generator (SG) with Krawczyk's parameters [8, 19] , LILI- [7] , DECIM v2 and DECIM-128 [1, 2] . So far, the best known attack on the SG with Krawczyk's parameters is a nearpractical attack in [27] ; the best known attack on LILI-is a distinguishing attack which requires 2 103 bits keystream and 2 103 operations [11] . Previous work [3, 22, 25] on DECIM focused on the initialization phase which does not contain the ABSG algorithm and there are no known cryptanalytic result on DECIM exploiting the properties of the ABSG decimation. In order to get better attacks on these stream ciphers, we first present an improved correlation analysis of various irregular decimation mechanisms in a unified way, which allows us to get much larger correlation probabilities in these mechanisms than previously known results [16, 26] . Then new correlation attacks are launched against the SG with Krawczyk's parameters, LILI-, DECIM v2 and DECIM-128 to precisely access the security margin of these ciphers. We show that the SG with Krawczyk's parameters is practically insecure. We also show that the initial internal state of LILI-can be recovered in 2 72.5 operations with a success rate of 93.4%, if 2 24.1 -bit keystream and 2 74.1 -bit memory are available. This disproves the designers' conjecture that the complexity of any divide-and-conquer attack on LILI-is in excess of 2 128 operations and requires a large amount of keystream. We also examine the main design idea behind DECIM, i.e., to filter and then decimate the output using the ABSG algorithm, by showing a class of rather large correlations in the ABSG mechanism and mounting attacks faster than exhaustive search on a 160-bit (out of 192-bit) reduced version of DECIM v2 and on a 256-bit (out of 288-bit) reduced version of DECIM-128. We then extend the attack to the full length versions and show that our attack, though slower than exhaustive key search, is 2 35 times faster than the generic time/memory/data tradeoffs. This is the first nontrivial cryptanalytic result on DECIM besides the tricky time/memory/data tradeoffs. While our result confirms the underlying design idea, it shows an interesting fact that the security of DECIM rely more on the length of the involved LFSR than on the ABSG algorithm.
This paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the four target stream ciphers in Section 2. Then an improved correlation analysis of various irregular decimations in a unified way is presented in Section 3. The application of our method to the SG with Krawczyk's parameters, LILI-, DECIM v2 and DECIM-128 are given in Section 4 respectively. Finally, some conclusions are provided in Section 5.
Four Irregularly Decimated Stream Ciphers
The shrinking generator (SG) was proposed in [8] at Crypto'93, which is considered as one of the simplest and strongest stream ciphers currently available. It consists of two LFSR's, say the data LFSR B and the control LFSR S. LFSR B is irregularly decimated by the regularly clocked LFSR S according to the following rule: the output bit of the data LFSR B is taken iff the current output bit of the control LFSR S is 1. In [19] , Krawczyk suggested to use a SG with the following parameters, i.e., LFSR B of length 61 and LFSR S of similar length.
The diagrams of LILI and DECIM are presented in Figure 1 . In LILI [6, 7] , there are two components, i.e., the data generation subsystem and the clock control subsystem. The function f c takes two stages from the regularly clocked LFSR c as inputs and produces an integer c j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} which defines the There are two algorithms in this family, i.e., LILI-128 and LILI-. LILI-is shown to be much stronger than its predecessor LILI-128 in security. We stress here that our target cipher is not the much weaker version LILI-128, but LILI-. DECIM contains a unique component in eSTREAM project [1] and is recognized as interesting additions to the field of stream ciphers.
The ABSG algorithm
Input: (u0, u1, · · · ) Set: i ← 0 and j ← 0.
Repeat:
1. e ← ui, zj ← ui+1
In DECIM, the ABSG algorithm (shown in the block diagram) is used to generate keystream {z j } by irregularly decimating an input stream {u i } from a filter generator. Previous work [3, 22, 25] on DECIM focused on the initialization phase which does not contain the irregular decimation.
DECIM has entered into the third and last phase of the eSTREAM project. The main reason that DECIM is not selected in the final portfolio is its performance compared to other phase 3 hardware candidates. There are no known cryptanalytic result on DECIM exploiting the properties of the ABSG algorithm. Since our results on the latter 3 ciphers are structural cryptanalysis, we only need the relevant parameters of the specific designs, see Table 1 .
Correlation Analysis of Arbitrary Irregular Decimation Mechanism
In this section, we present some theoretical results on arbitrary irregular decimation mechanisms. It can be easily checked that the output of the shrinking process is {1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1}.
The advantage of the above viewpoint is that we need not know the actual values of {s i } when determining the data source bits. What we really need is the probabilistic distribution of {s i }, which can be determined according to the irregular decimation mechanism by experiments or by theoretical analysis. In the following, we always consider the shrinking-like representation and assume that the distribution of {s i } is known. Denote the input to the irregular decimation by {u i } and the output keystream by {z j }. It follows that {u i } is the data stream in the shrinking-like representation, but we do not know the corresponding {s i }. Let p 1 = P (s i = 1) and p 0 = P (s i = 0), then the index interval in {z j } that u i probably falls into can be determined, i.e., if u i (i ≥ 1) (without loss of generality, we assume that s 0 = 1 corresponds to u 0 ) was selected into the keystream, then we have u i = z i−1 t=0 st . By the central limit theorem, we have
→ N(0, 1), where N (0, 1) is the standard normal distribution. Thus, the probability that the index of u i in the keystream belongs to the interval
Let n i be the closest integer to
, then there are approximately 2n i + 1 possible indices in the interval I α . Thus, we can count the number of times that 0 and 1 appear in I α and make a majority poll to construct a prediction stream
, 1} and denote byb the complement of a bit b, then if N j > Nj, letũ i = j, otherwise letũ i =j. Thus, we have a predicted stream {ũ i } of {u i } satisfying the following theorem, which is a generalization of the results in [12, 26] .
Theorem 1. For any irregular decimation mechanism, there always exists a correlation between {ũ i } and {u i }, which is given by
Theorem 1, proved in Appendix A, depicts the basic weakness in any irregular decimation mechanism. It is worth noting that in (2), the only a priori knowledge is the distribution of {s i }, other elements such as P Iα and n i are determined by the choice of α. Besides, from (2), we have 0.
2 for any i ≥ 0, where the upper bound is achieved when i = 0. This fact means that the best correlation we can get is determined by the concrete irregular decimation algorithm itself. On the other hand, Theorem 1 shows that P (ũ i = u i ) decreases with i increasing. This is also the bottleneck of previous methods in [12, 16, 26] . To get the best correlation max α P (ũ i = u i ), we can pre-compute the optimal values of α for each i. Table 2 lists the average correlations, i−1 j=0 P (ũ j = u j )/i, we get for some i using the optimal values of α corresponding to the two decimation methods in LILI and DECIM. We made experiments to verify the theoretical values in Table 2 . In LILI-, when i = 10000, we get the average correlation of 0.518900 for 2 20 randomly chosen initial states of LFSR c and LFSR d, which is even better than the theoretical estimate. Remarks. Theorem 1 is achieved based on the premise that each bit in I α has the same probability of being correct. In fact, the probability that
0 , which are not the same for different r. Thus, at least in theory, for a given index interval I α , it is better to use the following measure to make a decision:
otherwise letũ i = 1. However, in this case, we have to compute a large number of binomial coefficients for constructing {ũ i }. To our knowledge, the most efficient method for computing binomial coefficient is by the recursion
r , which can be computed in about i 2 time. While in Theorem 1, the time for making a decision is at most linear in i. Besides, the probability that we made a correct decision, P (ũ i = u i ), under the theoretical method is not significantly higher than that in Theorem 1. Our experimental results reveal that the average difference between the two probabilities under the two methods are very small. For example, the gain by the latter method becomes lower than 10 −4 for i ≥ 2 16 . Therefore, we adopt the method in Theorem 1.
Next, we take a closer look at the method in Theorem 1. For eachũ i , the validity of the majority poll heavily depends on the distribution of 0 and 1 in the index interval I α . Denote by n i,0 and n i,1 the number of 0's and 1's in I α , respectively. Then it is easy to see that the higher the absolute value |n i,0 − n i,1 |, the higher the prediction reliability forũ i . This motivates us to make a prediction decision only at those positions where |n i,0 −n i,1 | is larger than a threshold value θ and otherwise we ignore that position. That is, let
In this way, we will get a prediction stream {ȗ i } at non-consecutive positions, e.g.,
The following theorem shows that the correlation between {ȗ i } and {u i } can be guaranteed.
Theorem 2. For any irregular decimation mechanism, if we construct {ȗ i } following (3), then the correlation between {ȗ i } and {u i } for positions i satisfying
Theorem 2, proved in Appendix B, shows that we can make P (ȗ i = u i ) greater than or equal to a value determined by both α and θ. Though we can set a large value of θ and a large size of I α to get a good enough correlation, the probability that we can find such a segment in the keystream is low. There is a tradeoff between P (ȗ i = u i ) and the number of points that having this correlation. This tradeoff is important for the application of Theorem 2. For simplicity, we denote the prediction stream by {ũ i } hereafter. In practice, we first set a pointer value i T and for i > i T , we use (3) to construct {ũ i }; while for i ≤ i T , we use Theorem 1 to construct {ũ i }. Let x be the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and x be the biggest integer less than or equal to
holds, where W H (·) is the hamming weight of the corresponding vector. Let
}. Then the probability that (5) occurs around the position i is the proportion between the cardinality of |A i | and all the possible values of Z i , which is given approximately by
where µ i = n i + 0.5 and
. Since P j is very close to P i if j is close to i, for simplicity, we use P i+ 
, a prediction stream {ũ i } i≥iT is constructed segment by segment. In each segment, the average correlation is determined by Theorem 3, proved in Appendix C. 
2 dx specified in (6) .
The validity of Theorem 3 is illustrated in Table 3 -6. For the SG, LILI-, DECIM v2 and DECIM-128, we give the theoretical estimates given by Theorem 3 and the corresponding experimental results. For each bias ε in Table  3 -6 and the corresponding N i , we verified the result by randomly assigning the initial state of the cipher 2 20 times. We see that the simulation results are very close to the theoretical values.
As we know, the correlations given in Table 3 -6 are the largest correlations reported for the four stream ciphers for the corresponding keystream length. For the SG, our results are at least 3.6 times larger than those reported in [16] . These large correlations remove the barrier (that the correlation decrease quickly with the keystream length increasing) identified by previous research [16, 26 ] to a large extent. Finally, we also need the following theorem to actually construct {ũ i } in our attack.
Theorem 4. If we choose an intermediate time point to be 0 and construct a prediction stream {ũ i } in two directions, as shown in the Figure 2. Then {ũ i } we get will be of double length, while the average correlation will be the same value as if only half of the keystream (one direction) is employed.
Theorem 4 is just an observation which can be verified easily. Note that the results in Table 3 -6 are only for one direction.
Applications
In this section, we use the theoretical results in Section 3 to launch new attacks against the four target ciphers. We need the following notations of the decoding algorithm in [27] involved in our attack.
-L is the length of the involved LFSR.
-k (k < L) is the number of initial state bits to be determined first.
-t is the weight of the parity-checks.
-n is the number of the coefficient patterns appearing in all the parity-checks.
The Shrinking Generator
For the SG with Krawczyk's parameters, we use the correlations specified in Table 3 to mount a correlation attack as follows. [20] . Thus our attack is the best known attack against the SG with Krawczyk's parameters and shows that it is practically insecure. We have implemented the attack in C on a computer running under linux. On average, it takes tens of minutes to recover the state of the data LFSR. This is the first reported experimental result on the SG with Krawczyk's parameters. We have computed the Walsh transform of f d in LILI-, which is listed in Table 7 .The Walsh transform values marked with a star are used in our attack, which give W = 236 + 552 + 494 + 364 + 100 + 272 + 78 + 384 = 2480 linear approximations for each bit ofũ i . We first restore the target state of LFSR d, then the corresponding state of LFSR c can be recovered easily, e.g., using the method from [10] . From Table 7 , the average correlation between the regularly clocked output of f d and its input is ( Table  4 
LILI-
The total time complexity of our attack is 2 72.32 + 2 69.3 ≈ 2 72.5 operations, which is much faster than the exhaustive search for the 128-bit key. Compared to the distinguishing attack in [11] , our attack is a state recovery attack with the 2 79 times smaller data complexity and the 2 31 times smaller time complexity. We have implemented the attack on a reduced version of LILI-, (LFSR d is of 40-bit), on the same computer as in the SG case. It takes few minutes to recover the state of the 40-bit LFSR d with 2
16.1 -bit keystream.
DECIM v2 and DECIM-128
The attack routine is the same as that in LILI-. To construct {s i } for the ABSG mechanism, we let the bit pair corresponding to (ū,ū) be (10) and let the bit string corresponding to (ū, u i ,ū) be (010 · · · 0) of length i + 2. Note that we have more choices other than (010 · · · 0) here, e.g., we can let it to be (001 · · · 0). It has no effect on the output keystream. For simplicity, we let (ū, u i ,ū) be (010 · · · 0). Since
, we have P (s i = 1) = Table 5 and Table 9 .
From Table 5 
Conclusions
We presented an improved correlation analysis of arbitrary irregular decimation mechanism and demonstrated the best known attacks on four well-known stream ciphers using irregular decimation. We believe that our correlation analysis can be used to mount efficient attacks against other stream ciphers using irregular decimation, e.g. the alternating step generator and the self-shrinking generator.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Note that an irregular decimation mechanism is characterized by the distribution of {s i } in the shrinking-like representation. From the shrinking-like representation and the majority poll, we have
= 0.5p
where
Substituting (8) into (7), we have (2).
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. .
C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. From Theorem 2, in the interval (i, 2i], we have ) is complicated in theory. Instead, we use the numerical experiments to determine the value of this term. We made experiments to determine this value in the context of the shrinking generator, LILI-, DECIM v2 and DECIM-128, it turns out that we can take this value as 0.5. This is illustrated by our experimental results, performed 2 20 times for each ε and N i , which are given in Table 3-6. In addition, note that the probability in (6) can be rewritten as 
for n i ≥ 50. This fact determines the choice of β. 
D Average Correlation in 160-Bit Reduced Version of DECIM

E Attack Complexity on Full Length Versions of DECIM and Comparisons with TMD
Note that the complexities of the TMD attack are only rough estimates that ignore the logarithmic factors, while the complexities of our attack are much more accurate values. Our attack is at least 2 35 times faster than the TMD attack in total complexity, while with much smaller data complexity. 
